Bethencourt, Carlos and Kunze, Lars (2013): Tax evasion, social norms and economic growth.
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Abstract
This paper proposes a theoretical model to account for the most relevant micro- and macroeconomic empirical facts in the tax evasion literature. To do so, we integrate tax morale into a dynamic overlapping generations model of capital income tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as a social norm for tax compliance. It is shown that accounting for such nonpecuniary costs of evasion may not only explain (i) why some taxpayers never evade even if the gamble is profitable, and (ii) how a higher tax rate can increase evasion, but also that (iii) the share of evaded taxes over GDP decreases with the stage of economic development and (iv) that tax morale is positively correlated with the level of GDP per capita as suggested by recent empirical evidence. Finally, a higher tax rate increases aggregate evasion as well as the number of evaders in the economy when taxpayers decisions are interdependent.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Tax evasion, social norms and economic growth |
English Title: | Tax evasion, social norms and economic growth |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | tax evasion, social norms, overlapping generations, economic growth |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D9 - Intertemporal Choice > D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice ; Life Cycle Models and Saving H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification |
Item ID: | 48427 |
Depositing User: | Carlos Bethencourt |
Date Deposited: | 23 Jul 2013 07:50 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 14:43 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/48427 |