Chichilnisky, Graciela (1983): Social choice and game theory: recent results with a topological approach. Published in: Social Choice and Welfare , Vol. Chap. , (1983): pp. 79-102.
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This chapter presents a summary of recent results obtained in game and social choice theories, and highlights the application and the development of tools in algebraic topology. The purpose is expository: no attempt is made to provide complete proofs, for which references are given, nor to review the previous work in this area, which covers a significant subset of the economic literature. The aim is to provide an oriented guide to recent results, through economic examples with geometric interpretations, and to indicate possible fruitful avenues of research.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Social choice and game theory: recent results with a topological approach|
|Keywords:||social choice; game theory; algebraic topology; topological; pareto condition; preferences; Nash equilibrium; transversality|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
|Depositing User:||Graciela Chichilnisky|
|Date Deposited:||03. Apr 2008 04:37|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 03:27|
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