All-stage strong correlated equilibrium

Heller, Yuval (2008): All-stage strong correlated equilibrium.

Abstract

A strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations. Different notions of strong correlated equilibria have been defined in the literature. One major difference among those definitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating players receive their part of the correlated profile. In this note we show that an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium (Moreno D., Wooders J., 1996. Games Econ. Behav. 17, 80-113) is immune to deviations at all stages of any pre-play signalling process that implements it. Thus the set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: correlated equilibrium; strong equilbrium; coaliton-proof equilbrium; ex-ante; ex-post; common knowledge
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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