Heller, Yuval (2008): AllStage strong correlated equilbrium.
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Abstract
A strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations. Different notions of strong correlated equilibria were defined in the literature. One major difference among those definitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation: before (exante) or after (expost) the deviating players receive their part of the correlated profile. In this paper we prove that if deviating coalitions are allowed to use new correlating devices, then an exante strong correlated equilibrium is immune to deviations at all stages. Thus the set of exante strong correlated equilibria of Moreno & Wooders (1996) is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  AllStage strong correlated equilbrium 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  coalitionproofness, strong correlated equilibrium, common knowledge, incomplete information, noncooperative games 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D8  Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82  Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  8141 
Depositing User:  Yuval Heller 
Date Deposited:  08. Apr 2008 00:30 
Last Modified:  19. Mar 2013 12:53 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/8141 
Available Versions of this Item

Exante and expost strong correlated equilbrium. (deposited 12. Mar 2008 16:21)

AllStage strong correlated equilbrium. (deposited 25. Mar 2008 05:32)
 AllStage strong correlated equilbrium. (deposited 31. Mar 2014 15:24)
 AllStage strong correlated equilbrium. (deposited 08. Apr 2008 00:30) [Currently Displayed]

AllStage strong correlated equilbrium. (deposited 25. Mar 2008 05:32)