Heller, Yuval (2008): AllStage strong correlated equilbrium. Published in: Games and Economic Behaivor , Vol. 69, No. 1 (May 2010): pp. 184188.
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Abstract
A strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations. Different notions of strong correlated equilibria were defined in the literature. One major difference among those definitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation: before (exante) or after (expost) the deviating players receive their part of the correlated profile. In this paper we prove that if deviating coalitions are allowed to use new correlating devices, then an exante strong correlated equilibrium is immune to deviations at all stages. Thus the set of exante strong correlated equilibria of Moreno & Wooders (1996) is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  AllStage strong correlated equilbrium 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  correlated equilibrium; strong equilbrium; coalitonproof equilbrium; exante; expost; common knowledge 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  54904 
Depositing User:  Yuval Heller 
Date Deposited:  31 Mar 2014 15:24 
Last Modified:  28 Sep 2019 04:35 
References:  Aumann, 1959 R. Aumann Acceptable points in general cooperative nperson games H.W. Kuhn, R.D. Luce (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. IVPrinceton University Press, Princeton, NJ (1959), pp. 287–324 R. Aumann Agreeing to disagree Ann. Statist., 4 (6) (1976), pp. 1236–1239 Aumann, 1987 R. Aumann Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality Econometrica, 55 (1987), pp. 1–18 Bernheim et al., 1987 B.D. Bernheim, B. Peleg, M. Whinston Coalitionproof Nash equilibria—I. Concepts J. Econ. Theory, 42 (1987), pp. 1–12 Bloch and Dutta, 2009 F. Bloch, B. Dutta Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations Games Econ. Behav., 66 (2) (2009), pp. 721–728 Article  PDF (167 K)  View Record in Scopus  Cited By in Scopus (8) Einy and Peleg, 1995 E. Einy, B. Peleg Coalitionproof communication equilibria W. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles, N. Schofield (Eds.), Social Choice, Welfare & Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1995) Heller, 2010 Y. Heller Minorityproof cheaptalk protocol Games Econ. Behav., 68 (2) (2010), pp. 746–752 in this issue Holmstrom and Myerson, 1983 B. Holmstrom, R.B. Myerson Efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information Econometrica, 51 (1983), pp. 1799–1819 Milgrom and Roberts, 1996 P. Milgrom, J. Roberts Coalitionproofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities Games Econ. Behav., 17 (1996), pp. 113–128 Moreno and Wooders, 1996 D. Moreno, J. Wooders Coalitionproof equilibrium Games Econ. Behav., 17 (1996), pp. 80–113 Moulin and Vial, 1978 H. Moulin, J.P. Vial Strategically zerosum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon Int. J. Game Theory, 7 (1978), pp. 201–221 Ray, 1996 I. Ray Coalitionproof correlated equilibrium: A definition Games Econ. Behav., 17 (1996), pp. 56–79 Ray, 1998 I. Ray Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior Rev. Econ. Design, 3 (1998), pp. 257–269 
URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/54904 
Available Versions of this Item

Exante and expost strong correlated equilbrium. (deposited 12 Mar 2008 16:21)

AllStage strong correlated equilbrium. (deposited 25 Mar 2008 05:32)
 AllStage strong correlated equilbrium. (deposited 31 Mar 2014 15:24) [Currently Displayed]
 AllStage strong correlated equilbrium. (deposited 08 Apr 2008 00:30)

AllStage strong correlated equilbrium. (deposited 25 Mar 2008 05:32)