Single vs. multiple disclosures in an experimental asset market with information acquisition

Ruiz-Buforn, Alba and Alfarano, Simone and Camacho-Cuena, Eva and Morone, Andrea (2020): Single vs. multiple disclosures in an experimental asset market with information acquisition.

Abstract

We conduct laboratory experiments to study whether increasing the number of independent public signals in an economy with endogenous private information is an effective measure to promote the acquisition of information and to enhance price efficiency. We observe that the release of public information crowds out the traders' demand for private information under a single disclosure while favoring private information acquisition under multiple disclosures. The latter measure improves price accuracy in forecasting the asset fundamental value. However, multiple disclosures do not eliminate the adverse effect of market overreaction to public information, becoming a potential source of fragility for the financial system.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Experiments; Financial markets; Public information; Information acquisition; Multiple disclosures
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G14 - Information and Market Efficiency ; Event Studies ; Insider Trading

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