Penta, Antonio (2004): Perfect Sequential Reciprocity and Dynamic Consistency.
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Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger�s (2004) extends Rabin�s (1993) theory of reciprocity in a dynamic sense, introducing a rule of revision for player�s beliefs. The Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium [SRE] they define can be dynamically inconsistent. In this article it is argued that such dynamic inconsistency is not intrinsically related to issues of reciprocity, but rather to the particular way the beliefs�updating process is modeled. A refinement of the SRE, which is both dynamically consistent and, it is argued, more sound to assumptions usually made in the literature of information economics and philosophy, is proposed.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Perfect Sequential Reciprocity and Dynamic Consistency|
|Keywords:||Reciprocity;� Dynamic Consistency|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
|Depositing User:||Antonio Penta|
|Date Deposited:||02. Sep 2008 12:18|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 10:42|
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