Garrod, Luke and Olczak, Matthew and Wilson, Chris M (2020): Price Advertising, Double Marginalisation and Vertical Restraints.
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Abstract
Abstract The developing literature on consumer information and vertical relations has yet to consider information provision via costly retail price advertising. By exploring this, we show that the double marginalisation problem exists in equilibrium despite an upstream supplier offering a two-part tariff that is common knowledge to consumers. Intuitively, the supplier elicits higher retail prices to strategically reduce retailers' advertising expenditure in order to extract additional rents. We then demonstrate how vertical restraints, such as resale price maintenance, can increase supply-chain profits and consumer welfare by lowering retail prices despite paradoxically discouraging price advertising.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Price Advertising, Double Marginalisation and Vertical Restraints |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Price Advertising; Consumer Search; Double Marginalisation; Vertical Restraints; Clearinghouse |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D40 - General D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts |
Item ID: | 102621 |
Depositing User: | Chris M Wilson |
Date Deposited: | 27 Aug 2020 09:56 |
Last Modified: | 27 Aug 2020 09:56 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/102621 |