Uchida, Yuki and Ono, Tetsuo (2020): Generational Distribution of Fiscal Burdens: A Positive Analysis.
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Abstract
This study presents a political economy model with overlapping generations to analyze the effects of population aging on fiscal policy formation and the resulting distribution of fiscal burden across generations. The analysis shows that increased political power of the old, arising from population aging, leads to (i) an increase in the ratio of labor income tax revenue to GDP and the ratio of debt to GDP, and (ii) an increase in the ratio of capital income tax revenue to GDP in countries with high degrees of preferences for public goods, but an initial decrease followed by an increase in this ratio in countries with low degrees of preferences for public goods.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Generational Distribution of Fiscal Burdens: A Positive Analysis |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Generational burden; Overlapping generations; Political economy; Population aging; Public debt |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy > E24 - Employment ; Unemployment ; Wages ; Intergenerational Income Distribution ; Aggregate Human Capital ; Aggregate Labor Productivity E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H60 - General |
Item ID: | 102826 |
Depositing User: | Professor Tetsuo Ono |
Date Deposited: | 15 Sep 2020 14:34 |
Last Modified: | 15 Sep 2020 14:34 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/102826 |