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On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions

Roy, Souvik and Sadhukhan, Soumyarup (2020): On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions.

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Abstract

We consider a weaker notion of strategy-proofness called upper contour strategy-proofness (UCSP) and investigate its relation with strategy-proofness (SP) for random social choice functions (RSCFs). Apart from providing a simpler way to check whether a given RSCF is SP or not, UCSP is useful in modeling the incentive structures for certain behavioral agents. We show that SP is equivalent to UCSP and elementary monotonicity on any domain satisfying the upper contour no restoration (UCNR) property. To analyze UCSP on multi-dimensional domains, we consider some block structure over the preferences. We show that SP is equivalent to UCSP and block monotonicity on domains satisfying the block restricted upper contour preservation property. Next, we analyze the relation between SP and UCSP under unanimity and show that SP becomes equivalent to UCSP and multi-swap monotonicity on any domain satisfying the multi-swap UCNR property. Finally, we show that if there are two agents, then under unanimity, UCSP alone becomes equivalent to SP on any domain satisfying the swap UCNR property. We provide applications of our results on the unrestricted, single-peaked, single-crossing, single-dipped, hybrid, and multi-dimensional domains such as lexicographically separable domains with one component ordering and domains under committee formation.

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