Conditional Rewarding Behaviour: An Experiment

Nesterov, Artem (2020): Conditional Rewarding Behaviour: An Experiment.

Abstract

Both peer-to-peer punishments and rewards can be effective in increasing cooperation in dilemma situations. We follow Kamei’s experimental design [2014, Economics Letters 124, pp.199-202], except we use a reward option instead of a punishment one. Consistent with Kamei (2014), decisions to reward are on average positively proportional to the others’ reward to the same recipient. We classify the rewarding types in a similar fashion and find fewer anti-social types.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: experiment, dilemma, cooperation, rewarding
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods

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