Banerjee, Sreoshi and De, Parikshit and Mitra, Manipushpak (2020): A welfarist approach to sequencing problems with incentives.

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Abstract
We adopt a welfarist approach to study sequencing problems in a private information setup. The ”generalized minimum welfare bound” (GMWB) is a universal representation of all the specific bounds that have been previously studied in the literature. Every agent is offered a protection in the form of a minimum guarantee on their utilities. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition to identify an outcome efficient and strategyproof mechanism that satisfies GMWB.We then characterize the entire class of mechanisms that satisfy outcome efficiency, strategy proofness and GMWB. These are termed as the class of ”relative pivotal mechanisms”. Our paper proposes relevant theoretical applications namely; exante initial order, identical costs bound and expected cost bound. We also give insights on the issues of feasibility and/or budget balance.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  A welfarist approach to sequencing problems with incentives 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  sequencing problems, generalized minimum welfare bounds, outcome efficiency, strategyproofness, feasibility, budget balance 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games D  Microeconomics > D6  Welfare Economics > D63  Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations D  Microeconomics > D8  Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82  Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design 
Item ID:  107188 
Depositing User:  Miss Sreoshi Banerjee 
Date Deposited:  18 Apr 2021 08:28 
Last Modified:  18 Apr 2021 08:29 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/107188 