Armstrong, Mark and Vickers, John (2021): Patterns of Competitive Interaction.
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Abstract
We explore patterns of price competition in an oligopoly where consumers vary in the set of firms they consider for their purchase and buy from the lowest-priced firm they consider. We study a pattern of consideration, termed "symmetric interactions", that generalises models used in existing work (duopoly, symmetric firms, and firms with independent reach). Within this class, equilibrium profits are proportional to a firm's reach, firms with a larger reach set higher average prices, and a reduction in the number of firms (either by exit or by merger) harms consumers. However, increased competition (either by entry of by increased consumer awareness) does not always benefit consumers. We go on to study patterns of consideration with asymmetric interactions. In situations with disjoint reach and with nested reach we find equilibria in which price competition is "duopolistic": only two firms compete within each price range. We characterize the contrasting equilibrium patterns of price competition for all patterns of consideration in the three-firm case.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Patterns of Competitive Interaction |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Price competition, consideration sets, price dispersion, entry and merger. |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies |
Item ID: | 108398 |
Depositing User: | Mark Armstrong |
Date Deposited: | 21 Jun 2021 22:38 |
Last Modified: | 21 Jun 2021 22:38 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/108398 |