Uchida, Yuki and Ono, Tetsuo (2021): Generational Distribution of Fiscal Burdens: A Positive Analysis.
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_110634.pdf Download (873kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This study presents a political economy model with overlapping generations to analyze the effects of population aging on fiscal policy formation and the resulting distribution of the fiscal burden across generations. The analysis shows that both an increased life expectancy and a decreased population growth rate increase the ratios of government debt and labor income tax revenue to GDP. However, they decrease the ratio of capital income tax revenue to GDP. Furthermore, it also shows that the increased political weight of the elderly creates an increase in the ratios of public debt and labor income tax revenue to GDP, as well as an initial decrease followed by an increase in the ratio of capital income tax revenue to GDP.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Generational Distribution of Fiscal Burdens: A Positive Analysis |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Generational burden, Overlapping generations, Political economy, Population aging, Public debt |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy > E24 - Employment ; Unemployment ; Wages ; Intergenerational Income Distribution ; Aggregate Human Capital ; Aggregate Labor Productivity E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H60 - General |
Item ID: | 110634 |
Depositing User: | Professor Tetsuo Ono |
Date Deposited: | 12 Nov 2021 08:11 |
Last Modified: | 12 Nov 2021 08:11 |
References: | Andersen, T. M. (2019). Intergenerational conflict and public sector size and structure: A rationale for debt limits? European Journal of Political Economy, 57:70–88. Arai, R., Naito, K., and Ono, T. (2018). Intergenerational policies, public debt, and economic growth: A politico-economic analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 166:39–52. Arawatari, R. and Ono, T. (2017). Inequality and public debt: A positive analysis. Review ofInternational Economics, 25(5):1155–1173. Arcalean, C. (2018). Dynamic fiscal competition: A political economy theory. Journal of Public Economics, 164:211–224. Bassetto, M. (2008). Political economy of taxation in an overlapping-generations economy. Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(1):18–43. Beauchemin, K. R. (1998). Intergenerational politics, fiscal policy and productivity. Review of Economic Dynamics, 1(4):835–858. Bishnu, M. and Wang, M. (2017). The political intergenerational welfare state. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 77:93–110. Boldrin, M. and Rustichini, A. (2000). Political equilibria with social security. Review of Economic Dynamics, 3(1):41–78. Cukierman, A. and Meltzer, A. H. (1989). A political theory of government debt and deficits in a neo-Ricardian framework. American Economic Review, pages 713–732. de la Croix, D. and Doepke, M. (2003). Inequality and growth: why differential fertility matters. American Economic Review, 93(4):1091–1113. Forni, L. (2005). Social security as Markov equilibrium in OLG models. Review of Economic Dynamics, 8(1):178–194. Gonzalez-Eiras, M. and Niepelt, D. (2008). The future of social security. Journal of Monetary Economics, 55(2):197–218. Gonzalez-Eiras, M. and Niepelt, D. (2012). Ageing, government budgets, retirement, and growth. European Economic Review, 56(1):97–115. Greenwood, J., Hercowitz, Z., and Huffman, G. W. (1988). Investment, capacity utilization, and the real business cycle. American Economic Review, pages 402–417. Katagiri, M., Konishi, H., and Ueda, K. (2020). Aging and deflation from a fiscal perspective. Journal of Monetary Economics, 111:1–15. Klein, P., Krusell, P., and Rios-Rull, J.-V. (2008). Time-consistent public policy. Review of Economic Studies, 75(3):789–808. Klein, P. and R´ıos-Rull, J.-V. (2003). Time-consistent optimal fiscal policy. International Economic Review, 44(4):1217–1245. Kydland, F. E. and Prescott, E. C. (1982). Time to build and aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica, 50(6):1345–1370. Lancia, F. and Russo, A. (2016). Public education and pensions in democracy: A political economy theory. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(5):1038–1073. Lindbeck, A. and Weibull, J. W. (1987). Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition. Public Choice, 52(3):273–297. Martin, F. M. (2009). A positive theory of government debt. Review of Economic Dynamics, 12(4):608–631. Martin, F. M. (2010). Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34(3):503–521. Mateos-Planas, X. (2008). A quantitative theory of social security without commitment. Journal of Public Economics, 92(3-4):652–671. Mateos-Planas, X. (2010). Demographics and the politics of capital taxation in a life-cycle economy. American Economic Review, 100(1):337–63. M¨uller, A., Storesletten, K., and Zilibotti, F. (2016). The political color of fiscal responsibility. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(1):252–302. OECD (2007). Society at a Glance 2006. Ono, T. and Uchida, Y. (2016). Pensions, education, and growth: A positive analysis. Journal of Macroeconomics, 48:127–143. Ono, T. and Uchida, Y. (2018). Human capital, public debt, and economic growth: A political economy analysis. Journal of Macroeconomics, 57:1–14. Ortigueira, S., Pereira, J., and Pichler, P. (2012). Markov-perfect optimal fiscal policy: The case of unbalanced budgets. Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2002). Political economics: explaining economic policy. MIT press. Razin, A. and Sadka, E. (2007). Aging population: The complex effect of fiscal leakages on the politico-economic equilibrium. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(2):564–575. Razin, A., Sadka, E., and Swagel, P. (2004). Capital income taxation under majority voting with aging population. Review of World Economics, 140(3):476–495. Renstrom, T. I. (1996). Endogenous taxation: An overlapping generations approach. Economic Journal, 106(435):471–482. Rohrs, S. (2016). Public debt in a political economy. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 20(5):1282–1312. Song, Z., Storesletten, K., and Zilibotti, F. (2012). Rotten parents and disciplined children: A politico-economic theory of public expenditure and debt. Econometrica, 80(6):2785–2803. Trabandt, M. and Uhlig, H. (2011). The Laffer curve revisited. Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(4):305–327. Uchida, Y. and Ono, T. (2021). Political economy of taxation, debt ceilings, and growth. European Journal of Political Economy, 68:101996. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/110634 |