An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs

Korpela, Ville and Lombardi, Michele and Saulle, Riccardo (2021): An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs.

Abstract

We study rotation programs within the standard implementation framework under complete information. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the implementation of efficient rules in rotation programs. Moreover, we show that the conditions fully characterize the class of implementable multi-valued and efficient rules.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Rotation Programs; Job Rotation; Assignment Problems; Implementation; rights structures; Stability.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D04 - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation, Implementation, and Evaluation; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D47 - Market Design

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