Sanctions and export deflection: evidence from Iran

Haidar, Jamal Ibrahim (2017): Sanctions and export deflection: evidence from Iran. Published in: Economic Policy , Vol. 32, No. 90 (1 April 2017): pp. 319-355.

Abstract

Do export sanctions cause export deflection? Data on Iranian non-oil exporters between January 2006 and June 2011 shows that two-thirds of these exports were deflected to non-sanctioning countries after sanctions were imposed in 2008, and that at this time aggregate exports actually increased. Exporting firms reduced prices and increased quantities when exporting to a new destination, however, and suffered welfare losses as a result.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: sanctions; export deflection; exporters dynamics; trade; Iran; foreign policy; firms; welfare
• Subjects: F - International Economics > F0 - General; F - International Economics > F0 - General > F02 - International Economic Order and Integration; F - International Economics > F1 - Trade; F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F10 - General; F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F11 - Neoclassical Models of Trade; F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations; F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade; F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F15 - Economic Integration; F - International Economics > F6 - Economic Impacts of Globalization

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