Rajsbaum, Sergio and RaventósPujol, Armajac (2022): A Combinatorial Topology Approach to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.
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Abstract
Baryshnikov presented a remarkable algebraic topology proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem trying to understand the underlying reason behind the numerous proofs of this fundamental result of social choice theory. We present a combinatorial topology proof that does not use advance mathematics, and gives a very intuitive geometric reason for Arrow’s impossibility. The geometric proof for the basis case of two voters, n=2, and three alternatives, X=3, is based on the index lemma, that counts the absolute number of times that a closed curve in the plane travels around a point. This yields a characterization of the domain restrictions that allow nondictatorial aggregation functions. It also exposes the geometry behind prior pivotal arguments to Arrow’s impossibility. We explain why the basis case of two voters, is where this interesting geometry happens, by giving a simple proof that this case implies Arrow’s impossibility for any X≥ 3 and any finite n≥2.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  A Combinatorial Topology Approach to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Social choice; Arrow impossibility theorem; Combinatorial topology; Distributed computing; Topological social choice; Simplicial complexes; Domain restriction; Index lemma 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations 
Item ID:  113861 
Depositing User:  Armajac Raventós Pujol 
Date Deposited:  27 Jul 2022 23:06 
Last Modified:  27 Jul 2022 23:06 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/113861 
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