Pinoli, Sara (2008): Screening ex-ante or screening on-the-job? The impact of the employment contract.
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This paper studies how employers collect information about the quality of workers. Two are the strategies: screening ex-ante, through the recruitment process, and monitoring new hires at work, or screening on-the-job. Using two datasets representative of workers in Great Britain, we provide empirical evidence that the optimal choice is related to the type of employment contract offered by the .rm. Our estimates show that temporary workers are associated with lower recruitment effort - in terms of lower cost and higher speed - and closer monitoring than permanent employees. But this relation depends crucially on the type of jobs. Differences in screening effort are substantial for low-level occupations, while the gap is marginal or not significant for high-skilled jobs.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Screening ex-ante or screening on-the-job? The impact of the employment contract|
|Keywords:||Fixed-term contracts, Recruitment, Monitoring|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J41 - Labor Contracts
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers > J63 - Turnover ; Vacancies ; Layoffs
|Depositing User:||Sara Pinoli|
|Date Deposited:||08. Nov 2008 05:15|
|Last Modified:||17. Feb 2013 11:19|
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