All-pay auctions with resale

Sui, Yong (2006): All-pay auctions with resale.

Abstract

We study equilibria of first- and second-price all-pay auctions with resale when players’ signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. We show that existence of resale possibilities introduces an endogenous element to players’ valuations and creates a signaling incentive for players. We characterize symmetric bidding equilibria for both firstand second-price all-pay auctions with resale and provide sufficient conditions for existence of symmetric equilibria. Under our conditions we show that second-price all-pay auctions generate no less expected revenue than first-price all-pay auctions with resale. The initial seller could benefit from publicly disclosing his private information which is affiliated with players’ signals.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: all-pay auction, resale
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design

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