Does Public Good Provision Determine Incumbent’s Fate? Evidence from India

Paul, Saumik and Denzau, Arthur (2006): Does Public Good Provision Determine Incumbent’s Fate? Evidence from India.

Abstract

In this paper we empirically examine whether public facilities like providing primary school, medical clinics, electricity etc help incumbents to stay in power. Specifically, we analyze the parliamentary election outcomes in 483 constituents in rural India from 1971 to 1991. This study is based on a simple voter model where the voter looks at the supply of public goods provided by the incumbent and then decides whether to re-elect the incumbent. We find empirical evidence that voters do significantly care about educational, electricity and communication facilities, whereas incumbents face defeat if they provide more medical or safe drinking water facilities.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Election and voting behavior; performance of government; public good; inter-jurisdictional differential and their effect; India
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

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