Insider Trading with Semi-Informed Traders and Information Sharing: The Stackelberg Game

Daher, Wassim and Karam, Fida and Ahmed, Naveed (2023): Insider Trading with Semi-Informed Traders and Information Sharing: The Stackelberg Game.

Abstract

We study a generalization of the Kyle (1985) static model with two risk neutral insiders to the case where each insider is partially informed about the value of the stock and compete under Stackelberg setting. First, we characterize the linear Bayesian equilibrium. Then, we carry out a comparative statics analysis. Our findings reveal that partial information increases the insiders profits in a Stackelberg setting than in a Cournot setting. Finally we study the impact of the information sharing on equilibrium outcomes.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Insider trading, Risk neutrality, Partial Information, Stackelberg structure, Kyle model
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G14 - Information and Market Efficiency ; Event Studies ; Insider Trading

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