Promotions and Group Identity

Ďuriník, Michal and Morita, Hodaka and Servátka, Maroš and Zhang, Le (2023): Promotions and Group Identity.

Abstract

How does group identity influence promotion decisions and what impact does it have on the performance of organizations through promotions? We provide answers based on two experiments in which we identify the effect of group identity on the employers’ preferences regarding whom to promote, their expectations of the post-promotion effort of promoted and non-promoted workers, and the post-promotion effort itself. In both experiments, we find strong evidence of group identity biasing the employers’ preferences. The observed group identity bias in the promotion decision significantly reduces efficiency. Contributions to the literature on promotions in organizations and discrimination in promotions are discussed.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Group identity, in-group favoritism, post-promotion effort, post-promotion productivity, promotion decision
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J7 - Labor Discrimination; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M50 - General

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