A New Approach To Optimal Solutions Of Noncooperative Games: Accounting For Savage–Niehans Risk

Zhukovskiy, Vladislav and Zhukovskaya, Lidia and Mukhina, Yulia (2023): A New Approach To Optimal Solutions Of Noncooperative Games: Accounting For Savage–Niehans Risk. Published in:

Abstract

The novelty of the approach presented below is that each person in a conflict (player) seeks not only to increase his payoff but also to reduce his risk, taking into account a possible realization of any uncertainty from a given admissible set. A new concept, the so-called strongly-guaranteed Nash equilibrium in payoffs and risks, is introduced and its existence in mixed strategies is proved under standard assumptions of the theory of noncooperative games, i.e., compactness and convexity of the sets of players’ strategies and continuity of the payoff functions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Savage–Niehans risk, minimax regret, uncertainties, oncooperative game, optimal solution
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General > C00 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General > C02 - Mathematical Methods

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