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How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms

Pham, Hien (2023): How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms.

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Abstract

A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of willingness to pay across types, a screening menu of prices and threshold disclosures is optimal. Conversely, when its impact is marginal, bunching via a single posted price and threshold disclosure is (approximately) optimal. While information design expands the scope for random mechanisms to outperform their deterministic counterparts, its presence leads to an equivalence result regarding sequential versus. static screening.

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