The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2001): The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory.

Abstract

This article provides a non-technical survey on recent topics in the theory of contracts. The hold-up problem is presented and the incomplete contracts approach is discussed. Emphasis is put on conceptual problems and open questions that await further research.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Contract Theory; Hold-Up Problem; Incomplete Contracts
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks; D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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