Shachat, Jason (2009): Procuring Commodities: Request for Quote or Reverse Auctions?
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We examine the relative performances of reverse auctions and request for quotes in a simple commodity environment. Enterprises embarking on a reverse auction initiative often start with their commodity purchases. We conduct laboratory experiments and find that this is a poor starting point. Both the mean and variance of prices when sourcing through reverse auctions. With respect to the general investigation of auctions, the request for quote is the mirror image of a first price sealed bid auction and has the same symmetric Nash equilibrium. However, the request for quote allows identification of simple behavioral rules such as always bidding a percentage of your signal, which is indistinct from Nash equilibrium strategies in the sell auction counterpart. Consequently we estimate that one-fourth of the subjects follow a simple mark-up rule and approximately two-thirds follow a strategic Nash equilibrium strategy.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Procuring Commodities: Request for Quote or Reverse Auctions?|
|Keywords:||Procurement, Auction, Experiment|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Jason Shachat|
|Date Deposited:||15. Feb 2009 08:48|
|Last Modified:||22. Feb 2013 06:00|
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