Armstrong, Mark and Vickers, John (2009): A model of delegated project choice.
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Abstract
We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which other projects were available to the agent. We consider situations where the collection of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain, where the principal cannot observe the agent's payoff, where the principal can pay the agent to choose a desirable project, and where the agent must invest effort to discover a project.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | A model of delegated project choice |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Delegation, principal-agent, rules, merger policy, hurdle rates |
| Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies |
| Item ID: | 14161 |
| Depositing User: | Mark Armstrong |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Mar 2009 01:32 |
| Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 04:31 |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/14161 |
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A model of delegated project choice. (deposited 06 Jun 2008 07:28)
- A model of delegated project choice. (deposited 21 Mar 2009 01:32) [Currently Displayed]
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