Shchetinin, Oleg (2009): Contracting Under Reciprocal Altruism.
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I develop a model of contracting under reciprocal altruism accounting for some evidence which is paradoxical from the point of view of neoclassical models with selfish actors. My model predicts the crowding-out effect observed in the Trust Game with the possibility of a fine; for the Control Game the model predicts that an equilibrium can exhibit "no effect of control", "hidden cost of control", or "positive effect of control", depending on the characteristics of the actors, as observed in the lab. This suggests that reciprocal altruism modeling could be fruitful more generally in applications of contract theory.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Contracting Under Reciprocal Altruism|
|English Title:||Contracting Under Reciprocal Altruism|
|Keywords:||Reciprocal Altruism, Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation; Behavioral Economics, Signaling, Contract Theory|
|Subjects:||M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M54 - Labor Management
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Oleg Shchetinin|
|Date Deposited:||30. May 2009 18:24|
|Last Modified:||21. Mar 2015 17:56|
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Contracting Under Reciprocal Altruism. (deposited 18. Feb 2009 09:38)
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