Dai, Meixing and Sidiropoulos, Moïse (2009): Public investment, distortionary taxes and monetary policy transparency.
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In a two-period model with distortionay tax and public investment, we reexamine the interaction between monetary policy transparency and fiscal bias. We find that the optimal decisions of tax and public investment allow eliminating the effects of fiscal bias and hence neutralizing the impact of monetary policy opacity (lack of political transparency) on the level and variability of inflation and output, independently of institutional quality. Our results are robust under alternative game structures between the private sector, the government and the central bank.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Public investment, distortionary taxes and monetary policy transparency|
|Keywords:||bank transparency, distortionay tax, public investment, fiscal bias|
|Subjects:||E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy ; Stabilization ; Treasury Policy
|Date Deposited:||22. Jun 2009 01:20|
|Last Modified:||15. Feb 2013 19:56|
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