Shunda, Nicholas (2009): Auctioning with Aspirations: Keep Them Low (Enough).
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Abstract
In an auction with a buy price, a seller offers bidders the opportunity to forgo competing in an auction by transacting immediately at a pre-specified fixed price. If a seller has aspirations in the form of a reference price that depends upon the auction's reserve price and buy price, she does best to keep her aspirations sufficiently low by designing a no-reserve auction with a buy price low enough that some bidder types would exercise it with positive probability in equilibrium. The seller is indifferent between the auction component of her mechanism being a first- or second-price auction.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Auctioning with Aspirations: Keep Them Low (Enough) |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Auction; Aspiration; Buy price; Internet; Reference-dependence |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer Software C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Item ID: | 16242 |
Depositing User: | Nicholas Shunda |
Date Deposited: | 13 Jul 2009 23:46 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 08:59 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/16242 |