Zenker, Christina G. (2009): Veto Power and Wealth: Analysis of the Development of the Swiss Old Age Security.
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_16927.pdf Download (92kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Switzerland was one of the last OECD-countries to introduce a program for old age security – the AHV. For many decades, expenditures both in absolute terms and as a portion of GDP remained low in OECD comparison. In the 1970ies however, expenditures exploded – within 10 years, the expenditures as a percentage of GDP doubled. This article explains this astonishing development by applying the veto player theory. Veto player theory is useful to determine changes in the policy stability. The higher the policy stability, the more difficult it is to move away from the political status quo. The lower the policy stability, the more probable it is that reforms and changes in government programs can be achieved. This article shows that the policy stability was particularly high in the constitution phase (from 1890 to 1947) and the consolidation phase (from 1974 to the present) and low in the phase in between (from 1948 to 1973), when the foundation for the expansion was set.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Veto Power and Wealth: Analysis of the Development of the Swiss Old Age Security |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Veto player theory, Political Institutions, Direct Democracy, Social Spending |
Subjects: | H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
Item ID: | 16927 |
Depositing User: | Christina G. Zenker |
Date Deposited: | 25 Aug 2009 14:36 |
Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2019 10:19 |
References: | Binswanger, Peter (1986). Geschichte der AHV: Schweizerische Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung. Zürich: Pro Senectute Verlag. Bundeskanzlei der Schweiz (2006). http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/vab_2_2_4_1.html / Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990). The three worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Häusermann, Silja, Mach, André und Papadopoulos, Yannis (2004). From Corporatism to Partisan Politics: Social Policy Making under Strain in Switzerland. Swiss Political Science Review (10, 2), p. 33-59. Ischer, Philipp (2002). „Die AHV-Diskussion in der FDP. Die Genese des Sozialliberalismus und die Bemühungen des Freisinns um Orientierung in den 1940er Jahren“. In: Gilomen, Hans Jörg: Von der Barmherzigkeit zur Sozialversicherung. Umbrüche und Kontinuitäten vom Spätmittelalter bis zum 20. Jahrhundert. Zürich: Chronos Verlag. Moser, Peter (1996). Why is Swiss Politics so Stable? Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics. Vol. 132 (1), p. 31-61 Tsebelis, George (1995). Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 289-325 Tsebelis, George (2002). Veto Players. How Political Institutions work. Princeton: Princeton University Press. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/16927 |