Columba, Francesco and Gambacorta, Leonardo and Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio (2009): The effects of mutual guarantee consortia on the quality of bank lending. Published in: Revue Bancaire et Financiere , Vol. 4, (2009): pp. 226-232.
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Abstract
In this paper we investigate whether or not mutual guarantee consortia (MGC), a financial institution well developed in Italy, alleviate the difficulties that Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) face when they ask for a bank loan. We find that the probability of a small firm affiliated to a MGC of going into default is lower than that of firms not affiliated to such a consortium. These results indicate that MGCs improve the ability of banks to screen and monitor small firms.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | The effects of mutual guarantee consortia on the quality of bank lending |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | bank credit, financial intermediaries, small and medium enterprises, bad debt. |
Subjects: | O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O16 - Financial Markets ; Saving and Capital Investment ; Corporate Finance and Governance D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G30 - General G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages |
Item ID: | 17052 |
Depositing User: | Francesco Columba |
Date Deposited: | 02 Sep 2009 07:17 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 18:47 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/17052 |