Darke Side of Social Capital Social Preferences and Corruption

Jellal, Mohamed (2009): Darke Side of Social Capital Social Preferences and Corruption.

Abstract

Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not necessarily know the supervisor’s preferences. We formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more likely when the agent has information about the supervisor. This result suggests that corruption, which is likely to emerge in long term reciprocal relationships between public officials and potential bribery, may be reduced by the means of staff rotation. Evidence from an experimental study supports this proposition

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Principal Agent Supervisor paradigm; Social Capital ;Social Preferences;Bureaucracy;Corruption , Staff Rotation
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption; Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design

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