Selim, Tarek and Salem, Sherif (2009): Student Placement in Egyptian Colleges.
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We study students placement in Egyptian colleges under the current demand/supply placement mechanism implemented in Egypt (e-mechanism). We show that the e-mechanism is not Pareto efficient nor strategy proof and, moreover, it can not be improved to accommodate Pareto efficiency nor strategy proofness. The final conclusion is that it is better, from an efficiency point of view, to adopt a matching algorithm, like the Gale-Shapley mechanism, in students placement.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Student Placement in Egyptian Colleges|
|English Title:||Student Placement in Egyptian Colleges|
|Keywords:||Student placement, Gale-Shapley mechanism, e-mechanism, Egypt|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
|Depositing User:||Sherif Gamal Salem|
|Date Deposited:||30 Sep 2009 23:57|
|Last Modified:||10 Feb 2016 08:09|
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