Popp, Alexandru W. A.
(2008):
*The epistemic value of rationality.*

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## Abstract

Models of rational choice use different definitions of rationality. However, there is no clear description of the latter. We recognize rationality as a conceptual conglomerate where reason, judgment, deliberation, relativity, behavior, experience, and pragmatism interact. Using our definition, the game theoretic idealized principle of rationality becomes absolute. Our model gives a more precise account of the players, of their true behavior. We show that the Rational Method (RM) is the only process that can be used to achieve a specific goal. We also provide schematics of how information, beliefs, knowledge, actions, and purposes interact with and influence each other in order to achieve a specific goal. Furthermore, ration, the ability to think in the RM framework, is a singularity in time and space. Having a unilateral definition of rationality, different models and theories have now a common ground on which we can judge their soundness.

Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | The epistemic value of rationality |

Language: | English |

Keywords: | conceptual conglomerate, traditional rationality, rational method, ration |

Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C79 - Other C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C99 - Other C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B0 - General > B00 - General |

Item ID: | 17618 |

Depositing User: | Alexandru W. A. Popp |

Date Deposited: | 02 Oct 2009 10:15 |

Last Modified: | 09 Oct 2019 04:39 |

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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/17618 |