Logo
Munich Personal RePEc Archive

A formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models characterized by Single Mindedness

Canegrati, Emanuele (2007): A formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models characterized by Single Mindedness.

[thumbnail of MPRA_paper_1896.pdf]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_1896.pdf

Download (108kB) | Preview

Abstract

This work intends to specify a formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models with Single Mindedness Theory. The goal is to find an equivalent expression to the Ramsey’s rule for a political economy environment where Governments are assumed to be Leviathans rather than benevolents.

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact us: mpra@ub.uni-muenchen.de

This repository has been built using EPrints software.

MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by Logo of the University Library LMU Munich.