Are Stronger Executive Incentives Associated with Cross-listing? Evidence from China

Chi, Wei and Zhang, Haiyan (2008): Are Stronger Executive Incentives Associated with Cross-listing? Evidence from China.

Abstract

This study examines whether firms incorporated in mainland China benefit from cross-listing in Hong Kong, China. The Hong Kong Stock Market has more stringent rules regarding corporate governance and a better system of investor protection than the mainland market. Hong Kong companies generally provide strong incentives to executives via equity-based compensation. Have cross-listed companies learned from Hong Kong firms about adopting these strong executive incentives? The evidence from this study suggests that changes in top executive compensation are more sensitive to sales growth in cross-listed firms than they are in mainland firms without cross-listing. However, compared to Hong Kong firms, cross-listed firms are less sensitive to stock returns. Further, this study shows that it is necessary to differentiate between state-owned companies and private companies, as cross-listing may have a greater impact on executive incentives in state-owned companies than it does in private companies.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Cross-listing;Executive Compensation;Corporate Governance
• Subjects: J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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