Quesada, Antonio (2009): Decision by majority and the right to vote.
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The (relative) majority rule is a benchmark collective decision norm. This paper provides a simple characterization of the majority rule, for the two-alternative case, that relies on the following property: the choice prescribed by the rule to a group I of individuals must be the one that would be prescribed in at least 50% of the strict subgroups that can be formed in I. This property means if some subgroup is denied the right to participate in the collective decision, the most likely event is that the exclusion of the subgroup will have no effect on the decision.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Decision by majority and the right to vote|
|Keywords:||Social welfare function; majority rule; axiomatic characterization; two alternatives; manipulation.|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations|
|Depositing User:||Antonio Quesada|
|Date Deposited:||19. Dec 2009 11:23|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 02:52|
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