Estrada, Fernando (2009): Evolución Estrategica del Conflicto Armado en Colombia. Published in: Revista Analisis Político No. 67 (December 2009): pp. 156-181.
This is the latest version of this item.
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_20075.pdf Download (592kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling / Nozick / Gambetta. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author’s scientific output. A context of conflicts that includes new expressions of violence and the relative failure of the paramilitary reintegration involves using new analytical models (argumentation, game theory and inconsistent information). The recent evolution of emerging bands and their expansion into areas that were paramilitary camps requires monitoring not only of the government and the authorities, but those investigating the conflict in the present tense. The author proposes a heuristic research support from the theory of strategy Schelling, agencies and the protection of Nozick, Gambetta recent contributions on the relationshi p between organized crime and drug cartels.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Evolución Estrategica del Conflicto Armado en Colombia |
English Title: | Strategic Evolution of Armed Conflict in Colombia |
Language: | Spanish |
Keywords: | Colombia, armed conflict, drug trafficking, organized crime, paramilitary counterinsurgency war, Game Theory and inconsistent information. |
Subjects: | B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B4 - Economic Methodology > B40 - General D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H56 - National Security and War C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Item ID: | 20075 |
Depositing User: | Fernando Estrada |
Date Deposited: | 17 Jan 2010 16:10 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 16:42 |
References: | Estrada, Fernando, Estado Mínimo, Agencias de Protección y Control Territorial”, 2006, en Revista Análisis Político, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, v.56, pp.115 – 131. Estrada, Fernando, 2003, “El Escudo de Aquiles, Seguridad, Estado y Nuevas Guerras”, en Revista Semana/Editorial Planeta, pp.124 - 156. Estrada, Fernando, 2008, “El Soborno y la Amenaza en las Guerras Civiles”, Primer Congreso de Ciencia Política, Bogotá, Universidad De Los Andes. Estrada, Fernando, 2008, “Agencias de Protección y Poder Político Local”, Primer Congreso de Ciencia Política, Congreso de Ciencia Política Bogotá. Estrada, Fernando, 2007,“Estrategia de Comunicación y Paramilitares en Colombia, Investigar la Comunicación Retos Científicos y Compromisos Sociales. Estrada, Fernando, 2007, “Concentración de Tierras y Desplazamiento Forzado en Colombia, Caso Antioquia”, Dinámica del Conflicto Armado en el contexto de la política de Seguridad Democrática, Bogotá, Universidad Externado de Colombia. Estrada, Fernando, 2007, “Economía Política del Conflicto Armado en Colombia”, XXII Congreso Nacional de Estudiantes de Economía, Bucaramanga. Estrada, Fernando,2008, Análisis Actualizado del Conflicto Armado en Colombia”, Mataron a Gaitán, Celebración 60 años, Bogotá, Universidad Nacional en Colombia. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/20075 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
Evolución Estrategica del Conflicto Armado en Colombia. (deposited 17 Jan 2010 16:17)
- Evolución Estrategica del Conflicto Armado en Colombia. (deposited 17 Jan 2010 16:10) [Currently Displayed]