Micro-microcrédit et asymétries d’information : cas du Maroc

Abdelhamid, El Bouhadi and Omar, Essardi (2007): Micro-microcrédit et asymétries d’information : cas du Maroc.

Abstract

In this paper we apply the Principal/Agent theory in case of microcredit granted to the Moroccan micro-companies. The practice reveals us that a part of the receipted credits is diverted from its initial objective. Indeed, a situation of information asymmetries linked with adverse selection and moral hazard can be noticed. Given that the Agent behavior (the debtor) is unobservable, the Principal (the Creditor) cannot select every time the good types of Agents.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: INFORMATION asymmetries and microcredit: The Moroccan case
• Language: French
• Keywords: Microfinance; Microcredit Institutions; Moroccan Micro-companies; Adverse Selection; Moral Hazard; Principal/Agent Theory; Information Asymmetries.
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G28 - Government Policy and Regulation; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages

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