Langlais, Eric (2010): An analysis of bounded rationality in judicial litigations: the case with loss/disappointment averses plaintiffs.
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For psychologists, bounded rationality reflects the presence of cognitive dissonance and/or inconsistency, revealing that people use heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)) rather than sophisticated processes for the assessment of their beliefs. Recent research analyzing litigations and pretrial negotiations also focused on boundedly rational litigants (Bar-Gill (2005), Farmer and Peccorino (2002)) relying on a naïve modelling of the self-serving bias. Our paper in contrast introduces the case for disappointment averse litigants, relying on the axiomatic of Gull (1991). We show that this leads to a richer analysis in comparative statics; at the same time, this proves to be … disappointing: for the purposes of public policies in favour of the access to justice, recommendations are quite ambiguous.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||An analysis of bounded rationality in judicial litigations: the case with loss/disappointment averses plaintiffs|
|English Title:||An analysis of bounded rationality in judicial litigations: the case with loss/disappointment averse plaintiffs|
|Keywords:||conflicts, litigation, negotiation, disappointment aversion.|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
K - Law and Economics > K1 - Basic Areas of Law > K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K41 - Litigation Process
K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K31 - Labor Law
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Eric Langlais|
|Date Deposited:||26 Apr 2010 00:15|
|Last Modified:||25 Jan 2016 07:27|
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