Pivato, Marcus and Nehring, Klaus (2010): The McGarvey problem in judgement aggregation.
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Abstract
`Judgement aggregation' is a model of social choice where the space of social alternatives is the set of consistent truthvaluations (`judgements') on a family of logically interconnected propositions. It is wellknown that propositionwise majority voting can yield logically inconsistent judgements. We show that, for a variety of spaces, propositionwise majority voting can yield any possible judgement. By considering the geometry of subpolytopes of the Hamming cube, we also estimate the number of voters required to achieve all possible judgements. These results generalize the classic results of McGarvey (1953) and Stearns (1959).
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  The McGarvey problem in judgement aggregation 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  judgement aggregation; majority vote; McGarvey; Stearns; 0/1 polytope; Hamming cube; 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D70  General 
Item ID:  22600 
Depositing User:  Marcus Pivato 
Date Deposited:  11. May 2010 10:40 
Last Modified:  31. Dec 2015 00:12 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/22600 
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