Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A Note

Caruso, Raul (2007): Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A Note.

Abstract

This note is about the possibility of a stalemate in a continuing conflict. Following the prevailing economic literature on the topic, under some assumptions, the outcome of a conflict can be described in two ways: (i) a predetermined split of a contested output; (ii) a winner-take-all contest where the winning agent is capable to grab all the contested stake. By contrast, in reality many disputes do not have a clear or a definite outcome. A stalemate can end the conflict with the result of a draw. To allow for a stalemate, some formal modifications to the classical Hirshleifer’s model of conflict are needed. In particular, the possibility of a stalemate can be captured through a modified form of the Contest Success Function as axiomatized by Blavatskyy (2004). Under the possibility of a stalemate, the scenario exhibits a higher level of ‘guns’ than Hirshleifer’s classical model. At the same time, it also exhibits a lower degree of entropy.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Institute of Economic Policy, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano
• Language: English
• Keywords: Conflict; Stalemate; ‘Butter’; ‘Guns’; Hirshleifer; Entropy; Violence
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H56 - National Security and War; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining > J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions

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