Potrafke, Niklas (2010): Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951-2006.
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This paper examines whether electoral motives and government ideology influence short-term economic performance. I employ data on annual GDP growth in 21 OECD countries over the 1951-2006 period and provide a battery of empirical tests. In countries with two-party systems GDP growth is boosted before elections and, under leftwing governments, in the first two years of a legislative period. These findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two-party systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental performance. My findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government ideology and electoral motives influence short-term economic performance.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951-2006|
|Keywords:||political cycles, partisan politics, electoral motives, government ideology, short-term economic performance, panel data|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C2 - Single Equation Models ; Single Variables > C23 - Panel Data Models ; Spatio-temporal Models
O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O5 - Economywide Country Studies > O57 - Comparative Studies of Countries
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
|Depositing User:||Niklas Potrafke|
|Date Deposited:||12. Jul 2010 08:40|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 09:09|
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