Canale, Rosaria Rita (2010): Central bank reaction to public deficit and sound public finance: the case of the European Monetary Union. Published in: Journal of Advanced Studies in Finance , Vol. Volume, No. Issue 1, Summer 2010 (August 2010): pp. 4-17.
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The paper aims to shed light on the relation between monetary and fiscal policy in EMU, focusing on the interest rates and deficit dynamics. We present a theoretical model in which monetary and fiscal policy independently interact in a closed economic system through their own instrument, namely, the rate of interest for the central bank and deficit spending for governments. We demonstrate that the possibility of the two policy authorities producing not conflicting results depends on the idea each has of the workings of the economic system and on the influence each variable has on inflation and equilibrium income. Furthermore the inflationary opinion of the ECB about deficit spending leads to the result that public finance becomes surely unsound, unless governments stop using expansionary instruments. We provocatively conclude that the limits set by the Maastricht Treaty are a necessary solution to avoid unsound public finance.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Central bank reaction to public deficit and sound public finance: the case of the European Monetary Union|
|Keywords:||Monetary policy, Fiscal Policy, Policy coordination, EMU|
|Subjects:||E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy ; Stabilization ; Treasury Policy
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination
|Depositing User:||Rosaria Rita Canale|
|Date Deposited:||03. Sep 2010 08:00|
|Last Modified:||10. Jan 2016 06:10|
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Central bank reaction to public deficit and sound public finance: the case of the European Monetary Union. (deposited 20. May 2008 02:42)
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