Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Learning in Bayesian Regulation

Koray, Semih and Saglam, Ismail (2005): Learning in Bayesian Regulation. Published in: Economics Bulletin , Vol. 3, No. 12 (April 2007): pp. 1-10.

WarningThere is a more recent version of this item available.
[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_2704.pdf

Download (235kB) | Preview

Abstract

We examine the issue of learning in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. We show that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more information about his private type. Moreover, the outcome of the Bayesian mechanism regulating the agent is path-dependent; i.e. the convergence of the regulator's belief to the truth does not always yield the complete information outcome.

Available Versions of this Item

Logo of the University Library LMU Munich
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the University Library LMU Munich in Germany.