Koray, Semih and Saglam, Ismail (2005): Learning in Bayesian Regulation. Published in: Economics Bulletin , Vol. 3, No. 12 (April 2007): pp. 1-10.
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We examine the issue of learning in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. We show that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more information about his private type. Moreover, the outcome of the Bayesian mechanism regulating the agent is path-dependent; i.e. the convergence of the regulator's belief to the truth does not always yield the complete information outcome.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Learning in Bayesian Regulation|
|Keywords:||Learning; Principle-Agent Model; Bayesian Regulation; Incomplete Information Learning|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
|Depositing User:||Ismail Saglam|
|Date Deposited:||12. Apr 2007|
|Last Modified:||17. Feb 2013 19:26|
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Available Versions of this Item
Learning in Bayesian Regulation. (deposited 25. Feb 2007)
- Learning in Bayesian Regulation. (deposited 12. Apr 2007) [Currently Displayed]