Rosinger, Elemer Elad (2005): The Nash Equilibrium requires strong cooperation.
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Abstract
Contrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games, it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong cooperation assumption. Furthermore, in practice, this cooperation assumption is simply unrealistic.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | The Nash Equilibrium requires strong cooperation |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | non-cooperation, strong cooperation, mixup in the Nash equilibrium |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Item ID: | 27970 |
Depositing User: | Elemer Elad Rosinger |
Date Deposited: | 09 Jan 2011 19:34 |
Last Modified: | 02 Oct 2019 17:02 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/27970 |