Learning, Generalization and the Perception of Information: an Experimental Study

Novarese, Marco and Lanteri, Alessandro and Tibaldeschi, Cesare (2010): Learning, Generalization and the Perception of Information: an Experimental Study. Published in: New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science, edited by Marcello D'Agostino, Giulio Giorello, Federico Laudisa, Telmo Pievani and Corrado Sinigaglia, College Publications, London (2010)

Abstract

This article experimentally explores the way in which human agents learn how to process and manage new information. In an abstract setting, players should perform an everyday task: selecting information, making generalizations, distinguishing contexts. The tendency to generalize is common to all participants, but in a different way. Best players have a stringer tendency to generalise rules. A high score is, in fact, associated with low entropy for mistakes, that is with a tendency to repeat the same mistakes over and over. Though the repetition of mistakes might be considered a failure to properly employ feedback or a bias, it may instead turn out as a viable and successful procedure. This result is connected to the literature on learning.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: behavioural entropy, cognitive economics, complexity, experiments, feedback, heuristics, learning
• Subjects: A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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