Alcalde, Jose and Romero-Medina, Antonio (2011): On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems.
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This paper proposes a way to allocate students to schools such that conciliates Pareto efficiency and stability. Taking as a starting point the recent reform proposed by the Boston School Committee, we propose a marginal modification to reach our objective redefine how students are prioritize. Our proposal is to allow schools to prioritize only a small set of students an then use a common priority order for the rest. Under this condition we propose a score based priority ranking that makes the output of the new Boston Mechanism Pareto efficient and stable.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems|
|Keywords:||School allocation problem; Pareto efficient matching|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Jose Alcalde|
|Date Deposited:||17. Feb 2011 18:21|
|Last Modified:||19. Feb 2013 19:21|
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