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On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems

Alcalde, Jose and Romero-Medina, Antonio (2011): On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems.

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Abstract

This paper proposes a way to allocate students to schools such that conciliates Pareto efficiency and stability. Taking as a starting point the recent reform proposed by the Boston School Committee, we propose a marginal modification to reach our objective redefine how students are prioritize. Our proposal is to allow schools to prioritize only a small set of students an then use a common priority order for the rest. Under this condition we propose a score based priority ranking that makes the output of the new Boston Mechanism Pareto efficient and stable.

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